Thursday, August 04, 2005

Introduction to Christianity Part One: God, Chapter Five

“Belief in the Triune God” comes in two parts: “A start at understanding” and “Positive significance”. He begins with a warning: “we cannot overlook the fact that we are now touching a realm in which Christian theology must be more aware of its limits than it has often been in the past; a realm in which any false forthrightness in the attempt to gain too precise a knowledge is bound to end in disastrous foolishness; a realm in which only the humble admission of ignorance can be true knowledge and only wondering attendance before the incomprehensible mystery can be the right profession of faith in God.” (162)

“The point at issue here is whether man in his relations with God is only dealing with the reflections of his own consciousness or whether it is given to him to reach out beyond himself and to encounter God himself.” (164) I think this is another way of stating what Karl Adam has called ‘fictionalism’ – in other words, ‘true’, perhaps, but only as mankind’s self-generated diversion, so that even this theology becomes another layer added on top of philosophy and myth.

“We cannot endure as Christians if we think it permissible to make it easier for ourselves today than it was [for the ancient Church]. Let us anticipate the answer found in those days to the parting between the path of faith and a path bound to lead to the mere appearance of faith: God is as he shows himself; God does not show himself in a way in which he is not.” (165)

In this chapter Ratzinger pursues the development of the doctrine of the trinity, as well as the development of such ‘dead ends’ as Subordiantionism and Monarchinanism. He explains both as seductive simplifications. The ‘way’ to the truth about the trinity “means at bottom renouncing any solution and remaining content with a mystery that cannot be plumbed by man.” (168)

About Monarchinanism in particular Ratzinger adds this: “Even in its early Christian form and then again in it revival by Hegel and Marx, it has a decidedly political tinge; it is ‘political theology’ In the ancient Church it served the attempt to give the imperial monarchy a theological foundation; in Hegel it becomes the apotheosis of the Prussian state, and in Marx a program of action to secure a sound future for humanity. Conversely, it could be shown how in the old Church the victory of belief in the Trinity over Monarchianism signified a victory over the political abuse of theology: the ecclesiastical belief in the Trinity shattered the politically usable molds, destroyed the potentialities of theology as a political myth, and disowned the misuse of the Gospel to justify a political situation.” (171)

Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity as negative theology: “Every one of the main basic concepts in the doctrine of the Trinity was condemned at one time or another; they were all adopted only after the frustration of a condemnation; they are accepted only inasmuch as they are at the same time branded as unusable and admitted simply as poor stammering utterances – and no more.” (172)

Concerning theology and science: “that we put any questions or make any experiments at all is due to the fact that God for his part has agreed to the experiment, has entered into it himself as man. Through the human refraction of this one man we can thus come to know more than the mere man; in him who is both man and God, God has demonstrated his humanity and in the man has let himself be experienced.” (177)

In a second subchapter Ratzinger tries ‘to elucidate the signpost character of these references by means of three theses.”

“Thesis No. 1: The paradox ‘una esentia tres personae’ – one Being in three Persons - is associated with the question of the original meaning of unity and plurality.” (178) I think the main point here is that the Trinity is really a way of showing that ‘God stands above singular and plural. He bursts categories.’ Human concepts of unity, dualism and plurality are insufficient. God is beyond human calculation.

“Thesis No. 2: The paradox ‘una esentia tres personae’ is a function of the concept of person and is to be understood as an intrinsic implication of the concept of person.” Of course the divine person cannot be conceived of in human terms, for “the personality of God infinitely exceeds the human kind of personality.” (180)

“Thesis No. 3: The paradox ‘una esentia tres personae’ is connected with the problem of absolute and relative and emphasizes the absoluteness of the relative, of that which is in relation.” God is relational Being.

Ratzinger makes three other points: First, that dogma is a speech form, and as such one should not take these descriptive words as the reality itself, or even the only possible description, for “that would mean a failure to recognize the negative character of the language of theology, the purely tentative fashion in which it speaks.” (181) Second, putting it as succinctly as possible, not just logos, but dia-logos. Two quotations from St. Augustine are especially instructive: “He is not called Father in reference to himself but only in relation to the Son; seen by himself he is simply God,” and “In God there are no accidents, only substance and relation.” Furthermore, Christianity can be said to have acted as midwife to a revolution in human thought, “the sole dominion of thinking in terms of substance is ended; relation is discovered as an equally valid primordial mode of reality.” Third, that rather than being mere speculative theology, the doctrine of the Trinity is strongly connected to scripture and perhaps the best way to understand such passages as John 10:30, ‘I and the Father are one.’ Here Ratzinger makes use of St. Augustine again in his commentary on the Gospel of John. “My teaching is not my own, but his who sent me.” (John 7:16) This paradoxical statement, according to St. Augustine, breaks elementary rules of logic, and the ‘teaching’ becomes clear by confronting what is meant by the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ that lies behind it. This in turn leads to a reflection on the nature of selfhood itself.

As R. puts it: “The most individual element in us – the only thing that belongs to us in the last analysis – our own “I”, is at the same time the least individual element in us - for it is precisely our “I” that we have neither from ourselves nor for ourselves. The “I” is simultaneously what I have completely and what least of all belongs to me.”

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